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3 Disentangling governance: a synoptic view of regulation 4 by government, business and civil society

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8 Abstract Governance became a catch-all concept for various forms of steering by state 9 and non-state actors. While it pays tribute to the complexities of steering in poly-centred, 10 globalised societies, its fuzziness makes it difficult to oversee who actually steers whom 11 and with what means. By focussing mainly on actor constellations, the article disentangles 12 governance into seven basic types of regulation, four of them representing public policies 13 with varying degrees of government involvement and three depending solely on civil 14 society (civil regulation), on businesses (industry or business self-regulation) or on both 15 (civil co-regulation). Although each of the seven types is well known and extensively 16 researched, they are rarely joined in a synoptic view, making it difficult to grasp the totality 17 of contemporary governance. After introducing the seven basic types of regulation and co-18 regulation, the article addresses the interactions between them and it adds the widely used 19 concepts of hybrid regulation and meta-governance in distinct ways. The synoptic view 20 provided here helps to comprehend how governmental deregulation has been accompanied 21 by soft governmental regulation as well as "societal re-regulation". The concluding dis-22 cussion emphasises that this "regulatory reconfiguration" is the cumulative product of 23 countless, more or less spontaneous initiatives that coincide with forceful global trends. It 24 also stresses that the various forms of regulation by civil society and business actors are not 25 simply alternatives or complements to but often key prerequisites for effective public 26 policies. Although the essentials of the typology developed here can be applied universally 27 to a variety of policy issues, I focus it on how businesses are steered towards sustainable 28 development and Corporate Social Responsibility.

- 29 Keywords Governance · New governance · Regulation · Self-regulation · Co-regulation ·
- 30 Civil regulation · Hybrid regulation · Meta-governance · Sustainable development ·
- 31 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) · Stakeholder management · Business-government
- 32 relations · Business-society relations

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33 "Who is in charge here?" An approximation to governance, steering and regulation

34 Governance became a catch-all concept for various forms of steering by state and non-state 35 actors at all geographical levels (from local to international) and even across them. Since it aims at nothing less than capturing the full complexity of rule-making in poly-centred, globalised 36 37 societies in which "the state is far from the only game in town" (Abbott and Snidal 2008, 48; see 38 also Pierre and Peters 2000; Jordan 2008), there is not one single meaning of governance that can be pinned down easily. For the purpose of the present paper, governance is regarded as 39 synonymous with the broad notions of steering and regulation,¹ all three referring to formu-40 41 lating, promulgating, implementing and/or enforcing societally relevant rules (binding or voluntary ones) by government, business and/or societal actors, whereby the rules can apply to 42 others or to themselves (for a similar definition, see Levi-Faur 2010, 8f; for further details, see 43 44 "Governance aspects and typologies in different research strands"). In short, governance 45 denotes "the ways in which governing is carried out, without making any assumption as to which institutions or agents do the steering" (Gamble 2000 110) and as to with what means. 46

47 Despite (or perhaps because of) extensive research on the plethora of new forms of gover-48 nance, it is still difficult to oversee how modern societies are steered or-more colloquial-to 49 determine "Who is in charge here?" (Meadowcroft 2007). Consequently, it is difficult to comprehend how public policies and non-state types of regulation relate to each other. This is 50 51 not because governance scholars refrain from the daunting task of disentangling governance 52 into distinct types of regulation. As "Governance aspects and typologies in different research 53 strands" shows, taxonomic contributions are abundant, but either fail to differentiate adequately 54 between actors from the governmental, business and societal domains or blind out important 55 (often informal) types of regulation. The present paper aims to disentangle the governance 56 concept holistically based on who steers and how. Although the typology presented here can be 57 applied universally to a variety of policy issues, I focus it on how businesses are steered (or steer 58 themselves) towards sustainable development or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), inter 59 alia, because the environmental and sustainability policy fields have been "crucial venues for 60 real-life experimentation with new governance arrangements and the focus of a growing 61 governance literature" (Tollefson et al. 2012, 3; for details, see "Governance aspects and 62 typologies in different research strands"). By differentiating various types of regulation, the 63 paper puts the bits and pieces of contemporary governance into perspective. Although these bits and pieces are closely related in practice (see "Interactions, hybridisation, and orchestration (or 64 65 meta-governance)"), many of them are usually analysed separately from one another, some-66 times even in different disciplines with little exchange.

The next section selectively reviews how existing typologies attempt to disentangle the 67 governance concept, and it highlights that the three research strands on regulation, envi-68 ronmental governance and CSR provide valuable insights into the typology developed here. 69 Section "Unfolding the typology" disentangles the governance concept into seven actor-70 71 based types of regulation, and it illustrates them with a focus on how businesses are steered 72 towards sustainable development and CSR. Section "Interactions, hybridisation, and 73 orchestration (or meta-governance)" highlights how these types of regulation relate to each 74 other, and it adds hybrid regulation as well as meta-governance to the picture. Sec-75 tion "Discussion and conclusion" provides a concluding discussion.

 ¹FL01 ¹ For the synonymous use of governance and steering, see e.g. Rhodes (2000, 56). The synonymous use of governance and regulation is most obvious when scholars deviate from the standard vocabulary of "self-1FL03 regulation" or "co-regulation" and speak of "self-governance" or "co-governance" (Kooiman 2003, 1FL04 79–113).

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76 Governance aspects and typologies in different research strands

77 Who exactly steers businesses towards sustainable development with what means? Considering that the governance literature is mainly concerned with how societal steering has 78 been dispersed across society (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Scott 2004), conceptual as well 79 80 as taxonomic contributions pay surprisingly little attention to the actors engaged in par-81 ticular governance settings as regulators (here referred to as actor constellations). What we 82 often find in conceptual and taxonomic governance research is the too simple dichotomy of 83 state and non-state actors (see e.g. Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Treib et al. 2007; NEWGOV 84 2005; Tollefson et al. 2012; Doelle et al. 2012). A good example of a comprehensive stock taking of different types of business regulation that illustrates this weakness comes from 85 86 Börzel and Risse (2010). Although they recognise companies and civil society as two distinct non-governmental actors (Börzel and Risse 2010, 115), they relapse to the public-87 88 private dichotomy when organising different types of regulation. Based on a tripartite 89 classification of governance by Zürn (2002), they propose one type of regulation for 90 "governance by government" (i.e. "public regulation") and one for "governance without 91 government" (i.e. "private self-regulation"), but five types of regulation representing "governance with government" (Börzel and Risse 2010, 116f).² As the present article 92 93 highlights, this widely used classification is too vague with regard to the manifold forms of 94 governance without government.

95 For Mayntz (2004), governance scholars tend to ignore actor constellations not acci-96 dentally but systematically because they are usually preoccupied with the blurring of 97 boundaries between actors from different societal domains (see also Salamon 2002 41; 98 Börzel 1998; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Nelson 2004; Haufler 2001). Stoker fuels this 99 explanation with one of his five propositions on "governance as theory" saying, "Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 100 101 economic issues" (Stoker 1998, 18). No matter whether governance scholars blur or di-102 chotomise the boundaries between public and private actors, conceptual and taxonomic 103 contributions often ignore that private or non-state actors are hardly a useful analytical or 104 empirical category that helps to differentiate non-state regulation adequately. To recognise, 105 for example, the significant differences between business self-regulation and partnering 106 arrangements between businesses and civil society actors (or civil co-regulation), private 107 actors have to be differentiated accordingly (Glasbergen et al. 2007; van Huijstee and 108 Glasbergen 2010; Lambell et al. 2008; Abbott and Snidal 2008). The remainder of this 109 section shows that valuable insights into this and other aspects of disentangling governance 110 can be distilled from the literatures on regulation, environmental or sustainable develop-111 ment governance, and CSR.

112 Regulation can assume many different meanings. While it can be understood narrowly 113 as "authoritative rules" usually set by governmental institutions, it can also be understood

² A similar pooling of business and civil society actors to "private actors" can be found in an EU context. 2FL01 2FL02 Since the EU defines co-regulation as Community legislative acts that entrust the attainment of their objectives to non-state parties (European Parliament et al. 2003, C331/3), it overlooks not only all non-2FL03 2FL04 legislative forms of co-regulation such as public-private partnerships (see "Unfolding the typology"), but 2FL05 also the difference between civil society and business actors. Accordingly, the EU defines self-regulation 2FL06 "as the possibility for economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines at European level" (European 2FL07 Parliament et al. 2003, C321/3; see also Senden 2005). Since "economic operators" and CSOs do not 2FL08 2FL09 constitute a homogenous group that could be referred to as "themselves", this notion of self-regulation is too 2FL10 vague for scholarly (and perhaps also for practical) purposes.

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114 broadly as an umbrella term for "all mechanisms of social control, by whomsoever 115 exercised" (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004 3; see also Levi-Faur 2010, 4f). The broad 116 understanding of regulation is obviously very similar to the governance concept, with the 117 difference that the former traditionally pays more attention to actor constellations while the 118 latter usually takes in a more systemic perspective (Mayntz 2004; for confirming examples, 119 see e.g. Levi-Faur 2010; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004 11; Baldwin and Cave 1999, 63ff). 120 Resonating the works of Scharpf (1994, 1997) and many other policy analysts, Levi-Faur 121 emphasises, to "better understand regulation we need to pay close attention to the question 122 of Who are the regulators? What is being regulated? and How regulation is carried out?" 123 (Levi-Faur 2010, 9), and he adds that the question of "how to regulate" is closely linked 124 "to the question of 'who' regulates" (Levi-Faur 2010 11; see also Cafaggi 2011).³ Other 125 scholars also emphasise the importance of actor constellations, but their typologies are, 126 again, partial compared to what I propose here. Two examples: while Baldwin and Cave 127 (1999, 58-63), for example, do not address regulation by civil society actors (civil regu-128 lation) and by actors from more than one societal domain (co-regulation) at all, Abbott and 129 Snidal (2008) focus their "governance triangle" on formal standard-setting schemes in 130 international arenas, deliberately omitting less formalised steering practices such as civil 131 regulation via stakeholder pressure or CSR management (for a similar approach, see 132 Cafaggi 2011). The typology developed in "Unfolding the typology" appreciates the 133 emphasis (global/transnational) regulation research puts on actor constellations and com-134 plements it with insights taken from the following two research strands.

135 Environmental protection and sustainable development often require profound gover-136 nance changes (OECD 2001, 2002; Lafferty 2002, 2004; Jordan 2008). Consequently, 137 policy makers as well as researchers recognised early on that sustainable development is 138 not only concerned with first-order policy issues of "what to do", but also with second-139 order governance issues of "how to do it". This governance emphasis reflects strongly in 140 international policy documents, although with varying emphases. As early as 1972, the 141 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment noted that improving the human 142 environment for present and future generations "will demand the acceptance of respon-143 sibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all 144 sharing equitably in common efforts" (UNCHE 1972; for a brief review, see Jordan 2008). 145 While the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987) focused in particular on public governance, 146 the Rio "Earth Summit" (UNCED 1992) shifted attention towards civil society actors, and 147 the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD 2002) to the roles of 148 businesses in the governance of sustainable development (Zadek 2004a). As the president 149 of the World Resources Institute has pointedly put it, the two world summits (in particular 150 the Johannesburg Summit) represent "a shift from the stiff formal waltz of traditional

³ Since Levi-Faur (2010, 11f, 26f) pays close attention not only to who sets rules with what means, but also 3FL01 3FL02 to who monitors and enforces the rules, the typology he proposes mirrors the complexities of contemporary governance (e.g. in matrices displaying up to 36 types of regulation), but makes it difficult to identify some 3FL03 3FL04 basic types of regulation. Cafaggi (2011, 32), in turn, pays close attention not only to the regulators and 3FL05 those who are regulated, but also to the beneficiaries of regulation. While this differentiation is highly 3FL06 relevant in focused empirical research, it is difficult to employ in taxonomic works because steering 3FL07 practices of the same type can have varying beneficiaries. An example: as Héritier and Eckert (2008) show, 3FL08 self-regulation can benefit society (e.g. when the PVC industry reduces its environmental impacts) and/or 3FL09 the industry itself (e.g. when recycling quotas stabilise the paper industry), let alone governments who aim 3FL10 to solve problems without enacting new laws.

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151 diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisational solution oriented partnerships that may

152 include non-government organisations, willing governments and other stakeholders".⁴

153 Environmental policy and governance research traditionally pays close attention to actor 154 constellations, inter alia, because many environmental problems are negative external effects 155 of businesses on society (Delmas and Young 2009a; Delmas 2009, 221ff; Arts et al. 2009). 156 Consequently, respective research rarely speaks of public and private actors, but it differ-157 entiates the latter adequately (sometimes well beyond the general categories of civil society 158 and business as used here). This applies to comparatively narrow empirical studies (e.g. 159 Héritier and Eckert 2008) as well as to broad conceptual or taxonomic contributions (e.g. Arts 160 2005; Meadowcroft 2007). One of the most comprehensive typologies of environmental 161 governance is proposed by Delmas and Young (2009b). By conceptualising the societal 162 domains as three overlapping circles, they differentiate seven "environmental governance 163 systems": three within a single domain and four between them (Delmas and Young 2009b, 164 7ff; for an illustration inspired by this heuristic, see Fig. 1 in "Unfolding the typology"). 165 Although the differentiation of three actor groups and seven governance systems is a logical 166 (almost intuitive) way to organise the complexities of environmental governance that provides a clear understanding of who steers (with one exception⁵), their typology is less clear 167 168 with regard to how different actors actually accomplish steering. Instead of exploring means 169 or tools of governance systematically for each of the seven governance systems, the typology 170 refers to organisations (such as intergovernmental organisations), governance modes (such as 171 "non-state market-driven") and particular regulatory tools (such as negotiated agreements or 172 public-private partnerships) rather unsystematically. Metaphorically speaking, the typology 173 developed below makes use of the skeleton provided by Delmas and Young (2009b), but it 174 aims to put more conceptual, as well as empirical, meat on its bones, taken from all three 175 research strands described here (for similar heuristics, see also Abbott and Snidal 2008, 7f; 176 Lemos and Agrawal 2006; van Marrewijk 2003, 100).

177 Although rarely recognised as such, new governance and CSR are complementary 178 concepts that both fundamentally reshape the roles of the public and the private sectors in 179 similar directions. As outlined above, new governance accounts for the fact that govern-180 ments rely increasingly on non-state actors for achieving public policy goals. When 181 "crucial elements of authority are shared with a host of non-governmental [...] actors" 182 (Salamon 2002, 2), the roles of businesses in society change to the degree that they accept 183 the sharing of public responsibilities (Moon 2002; Midttun 2005; Steurer 2011). The 184 worldwide rise of CSR indicates that the private sector has embraced the sharing of public 185 responsibilities in recent years for whatever reasons and certainly to varying degrees. By 186 pursuing CSR as a management approach, businesses are supposed to widen their shortterm profit-making focus by integrating "social and environmental concerns in their 187 188 business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis" 189 (European Commission 2006, 2). Of course, not all activities pursued under the heading of 190 CSR can be regarded as a taking over of public responsibilities, let alone as regulation. 191 Apart from symbolic (or "green washing") actions, businesses can pursue CSR in three 192 basic ways: philanthropic, integrative (i.e. existing business operations are conducted more 193 responsibly) or innovative (i.e. new business models are developed for solving social and

⁴FL01 ⁴ http://archive.wri.org/newsroom/wrifeatures_text.cfm?ContentID=371; retrieved on 10 December 2011.

⁵FL01 ⁵ The actor group referred to as "private sector" mixes businesses, trade associations and consumers. 5FL02 Obviously, the latter usually represent societal rather than business interests and should therefore be 5FL03 regarded as civil society stakeholder group (Kurzer and Cooper 2007).

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194 environmental problems) (Halme and Laurila 2008). While philanthropic CSR can imply 195 the taking over of public (funding) responsibilities by businesses, integrative and inno-196 vative CSR as well as stakeholder management (Preble 2005) can also represent different 197 types of non-state regulation (see "Unfolding the typology"). Although CSR management 198 research provides nuanced empirical accounts of governance with and without government 199 (Utting 2005, 10; Zadek 2004a, b; Haufler 2001), interdisciplinary exchange between 200 governance and management studies is still limited. While the typology developed below 201 makes use of CSR and stakeholder management research, it ignores so far unsatisfactory 202 attempts to organise CSR as a new governance phenomenon.⁶

203 Unfolding the typology

204 This section disentangles the governance concept mainly based on the criterion "who 205 regulates". Its main categories are government, business and civil society. Although these 206 three societal domains are heterogeneous entities, each one consisting of a variety of actors 207 with often conflicting political interests (for a brief discussion see "Discussion and con-208 clusion"), actors from the same domain usually share at least a basic logic of action as well as some domain-specific resources.⁷ Therefore, and because the three actor categories 209 210 already result in a complex picture of seven types of regulation and co-regulation (see 211 Figs. 1, 2), I do not differentiate them further, with one exception: the self-regulation of 212 entire industries (e.g. by industry associations) is distinguished from the functionally 213 different self-regulation of single firms.

214 Once actor constellations are assorted, numerous secondary characteristics can be used 215 to further differentiate each of the seven types of regulation distinguished here, among 216 them the underlying governance modes (hierarchies, markets, networks), the geographical 217 scale of steering (local to global), the degree of formalisation (formal-informal) or the bindingness of rules (hard-soft; for the latter two criteria, see Tollefson et al. 2012⁸). To 218 219 keep the typology lucid, I do not refer to all these secondary characteristics in all societal 220 domains systematically, but only to those that constitute important sub-types of regulation, 221 namely the degree of formalisation in the societal domain and the bindingness of gov-222 ernmental regulation (for a brief discussion of the geographical scale, see "Discussion and 223 conclusion").

⁶ Albareda (2008), for example, describes a transition from self-regulation to co-regulation but does not 6FL01 address civil regulation via stakeholder pressure. Auld et al. (2008), in turn, typologise "The New Corporate 6FL02 Social Responsibility" based on incongruent "taxonomic categories" such as actors (i.e. "Government 6FL03 traditional" or "individual firms"), types of regulation ("partnerships") or particular tools of governance 6FL04 (i.e. "information approaches" or "environmental management systems"). Although the authors aim to 6FL05 provide a comprehensive picture of "CSR innovations", they overlook, inter alia, civil regulation, tripartite 6FL06 co-regulation and soft governmental regulation other than informational approaches (for details on these 6FL07 6FL08 types of regulation, see "Unfolding the typology").

⁷FL01 ⁷ As Abbott and Snidal (2008, 16ff) show in more detail, the ideal-type logic of action in the business domain is preoccupied with competitiveness and profitability, and the key resources of businesses are technical expertise and financial clout. In contrast, CSOs are "norm entrepreneurs" (Abbott and Snidal 2008, 17) that pursue special (rather than public) interests or values. Since their motivation is usually moral-rather than profit-oriented, their key resources are legitimacy and trustworthiness (Mitchell et al. 1998). For governments, see the following "Regulation by governments: hard and soft".

 ⁸ While Tollefson et al. (2012) consider actor constellations (or politics), the degree of institutionalisation and the regulatory dimension as three equivalent dimensions of governance, the typology developed here emphasises that actor constellations represent a primary criterion that shapes all other dimensions.

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224 The remainder of this section describes the seven basic types and respective sub-types 225 of regulation in terms of general characteristics, ideal-typical tools of governance that 226 represent "the relatively limited number of means or methods" by which governments, civil society and/or business actors effect steering,⁹ selected examples and the underlying 227 228 governance modes. By doing so, the section shows systematically how diverse the gov-229 ernance of sustainable development among businesses actually is and how important actor 230 constellations are for fully comprehending this diversity. What "Unfolding the typology" 231 cannot address are the strengths and weaknesses of the different types of regulation.

232 Regulation by governments: hard and soft

233 Despite the importance of "governance without government" (Rhodes 1996), govern-234 mental actors can still be regarded as the ultimate (although sometimes disoriented) reg-235 ulators of society and businesses (Kooiman 2003, 115-130; Bell and Hindmoor 2009), in 236 particular in the context of environmental and sustainable development policy making at 237 national and sub-national levels (Meadowcroft 2007; Arts et al. 2009; Delmas and Young 238 2009a). With regard to the bindingness of rules, mandatory (or "hard") and voluntary (or 239 "soft") governmental regulation can be distinguished as sub-types. Hard regulation means 240 that legislatures, ministries or public agencies define rules that are binding for all (or for all 241 members of a particular group) and that the executive and judicial branches of government 242 (or the agencies themselves) monitor and enforce compliance. The obvious tools of hard 243 governmental regulation are laws, decrees or (in the EU context) directives (metaphorically 244 also referred to as "sticks") and, less obvious, economic instruments (also referred to as 245 "carrots") such as taxes, fees and cap-and-trade schemes (Hood 1986). Although economic 246 instruments represent relatively "new environmental policy instruments" that are often addressed together with soft governmental (co-) regulation such as voluntary agreements or 247 248 partnerships (Jordan et al. 2005), they clearly conform to hard regulation as defined above. 249 Key differences between legal and economic instruments of hard regulation are the 250 underlying modes of governance. While hard law represents the hierarchical mode of 251 governance, hard economic instruments make use of both steering hierarchically and via 252 market forces. In addition, the two instrument types are different with respect to the leeway 253 they give to those regulated (rigid versus flexible), and their impact on technological 254 progress (favouring status quo versus facilitating innovation). For these and other reasons, 255 economic instruments have been eclipsing legal instruments to an increasing degree in 256 recent decades, in particular in environmental policy making (Jordan et al. 2005).

257 Although soft regulation is probably as old as its hard counterpart, the rise of gover-258 nance and CSR in recent decades leveraged and diversified respective practices into an 259 increasingly important sub-type of governmental regulation. In contrast to hard regulation, 260 the rules governments or public agencies formulate here are not legally binding, that is, they suggest (or facilitate) certain behaviours politically rather than prescribing and 261 enforcing them legally with sanctions (Mörth 2004b, 1-6).¹⁰ Since soft regulation is 262 263 usually a matter of persuasion, the legislative, executive and judicial powers of govern-264 ments are mainly relevant with regard to (Hood 1983; Steurer 2011):

"Nodality", that is, access to knowledge, monitoring data, dissemination and education channels (see also Hood 2007);

⁹FL01 ⁹ This definition is based on a definition of policy instruments provided by Howlett and Ramesh (1993, 4).

¹⁰FL01 ¹⁰ While Mörth (2004a) speaks of "soft law", I prefer the broader term soft regulation.








Fig. 1 Domain-specific types and sub-types of regulation. © R. Steurer

- Organisation in the form of monitoring and benchmarking capacities or as a means to
 lead by example (e.g. by applying sustainable management practices in the public
 sector);
- Government legitimacy and authority in a persuasive, non-hierarchical sense (see also
 Hysing 2009; Bell and Hindmoor 2012); and
- Fiscal means (e.g. subsidy programmes or sustainable public procurement) that can be used to create economic incentives for desired behaviour (see also Bell and Hindmoor 2012, 153).

275 Three of these four resources highlight that informational instruments (or "sermons", 276 metaphorically speaking) are the ideal-type approach of soft regulation (Scott 2004, 161). 277 These include endorsing statements, benchmarking reports, brochures, guidelines, websites 278 and media campaigns. Together with the legal and economic instruments described above, 279 they constitute a widely acknowledged tripartite standard set of policy instruments 280 (Howlett and Ramesh 1993; Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1997; Jordan et al. 2005). While legal 281 and economic instruments play a key role in hard regulation, an analysis of public policies 282 promoting CSR shows that they can also assume the characteristics of soft regulation 283 (Steurer 2010; 2011). This applies to laws (e.g. on CSR reporting) that do not foresee sanctions in case of non-compliance (Joseph 2002, 97ff)¹¹ and to economic incentive 284 285 instruments that are not obligatory (such as taxes) but optional (such as subsidies or green/ 286 sustainable public procurement). In addition, soft governmental regulation can also make 287 use of hybrid instruments such as labels (combining legal, informational and economic

¹¹FL01 ¹¹ For the important role soft law plays in the European context, see Mörth (2004c).

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incentive aspects) and public voluntary programmes (often combining informational and economic incentive aspects; for more details, see Steurer 2010). While soft economic incentives correspond with the market mode of governance, informational and soft legal instruments rely mainly on persuasion (for a brief discussion whether persuasion is a governance mode in its own right or not, see Steurer 2011, 278ff).

293 Self-regulation by businesses: collective and individual

294 Although the self-regulation of businesses can be traced back to craft guilds who began to 295 set professional standards independent of governments centuries ago (Baldwin and Cave 296 1999, 63), research on how businesses participate in societal steering in the era of gov-297 ernment was often rather concerned with how they lobby governments (see e.g. Mazey and 298 Richardson 1993). Although lobbying is still an important pathway of businesses steering 299 society (in particular in the environmental policy field), new forms of business self-regu-300 lation gained increasing attention in the era of governance among both governance and 301 management scholars (unfortunately without noteworthy interdisciplinary exchange). For 302 governance scholars, business self-regulation implies that businesses self-specify rules, self-303 monitor their conduct and self-enforce compliance without direct and explicit interference from the state or from civil society actors (Gunningham and Rees 1997; Sinclair 1997; 304 305 Bartle and Vass 2007). Since this definition makes it difficult to delineate self-regulation 306 from management, it is important to add that the voluntary rules impose restraints upon a 307 firm that are in the public interest (Maxwell et al. 2000, 584; see also Stiglitz 2009, 13).

308 Business self-regulation can take place at the levels of single firms or entire industries 309 (Gunningham and Rees 1997, 364; Potoski and Prakash 2005a, b). Industry self-regulation 310 means that a group of major companies or a trade association establishes agreements, standards, 311 codes of conduct or audit programmes that address all firms of a particular industry with varying 312 degrees of formalisation and bindingness. Although more stringent (or "hard") types of 313 industry self-regulation usually do not force companies to participate, they at least monitor 314 compliance and sanction non-compliance, for example with exclusion from the initiative 315 (Christmann and Taylor 2006; Prakash and Potoski 2007). An example for a comparatively 316 hard type of industry self-regulation is the "Vinyl 2010" voluntary agreement that was 317 established by four European PVC associations as a response to legislative threats concerning 318 environmental problems of the PVC industry (Héritier and Eckert 2008). Examples for com-319 paratively soft industry self-regulation are the Cement Sustainability Initiative (major cement 320 companies set individual carbon emission reduction goals on a voluntary basis) or even less 321 formalised sectoral objectives, set, for example, by major players of the aluminium and the steel 322 industry (Busch et al. 2008). Examples for industry self-regulation that foresee compliance 323 monitoring but are very soft in terms of what members are required to do are the "Responsible 324 Care" programme launched by the US Chemical Manufacturers Association in 1989 "in 325 response to declining public opinion about the chemical industry" (King and Lenox 2000, 699) 326 and the "Sustainable Forestry Initiative" certification standard launched by the American 327 Forest and Paper Association in 1994 as a response to the more demanding Forest Stewardship 328 Council (McDermott et al. 2008; Cashore 2002; see the sub-section on co-regulation).

The self-regulation of single firms, on the other hand, encompasses various voluntary practices of triple-bottom line management, such as applying environmental management systems, developing and implementing company codes of conduct or more comprehensive CSR strategies, reporting on CSR (Post et al. 2002; Halme and Laurila 2008). Obviously, many of the countless practices that fall into this category are less formalised than what other authors regard as self-regulation (see e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2008). An often-

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335 overlooked form of business self-regulation at the firm level (usually considered as 336 stakeholder management, see "Interactions, hybridisation, and orchestration (or meta-337 governance)") is when business partners such as large suppliers, bulk buyers, lenders or 338 institutional investors demand certain CSR practices. A prominent example of this kind of 339 "business-to-business self-regulation" is Nike's supply chain audit regime on labour 340 conditions, established as a response to civil society pressure (Zadek 2004a, b; Midttun 341 2008, 414f). As this and the other examples given above emphasise and "Interactions, 342 hybridisation, and orchestration (or meta-governance)" explores in more detail, business 343 self-regulation at whatever level is usually not isolated from but driven by other types of 344 regulation. What may appear as a business initiative is usually a strategic move that aims to 345 ease or pre-empt other forms of regulation, in particular hard governmental and civil 346 regulation (Maxwell et al. 2000, 583; Abbott and Snidal 2008).

347 Regulation by civil society: formal standard-setting and informal pressuring

348 In the "era of government", the spectrum of regulation was mostly limited to hard and soft 349 governmental regulation and business self-regulation. The current "era of governance" is 350 characterised in particular by a strengthening of societal actors such as civil society or-351 ganisations (CSOs) and other societal stakeholders of companies (such as consumers, 352 employees or local communities) as regulators or co-regulators. The manifold forms of 353 civil regulation can be subsumed under two broad (often closely intertwined) sub-types: 354 formal standard-setting and comparatively informal pressuring. Standard-setting means 355 that CSOs aim to steer businesses by demanding compliance with formalised standards 356 they have developed, such as Rugmark (a network of CSOs that created a label certifying 357 that a carpet is made without child labour), the Amnesty International Human Rights 358 Guidelines for Companies or the 10-point code of corporate environmental conduct pub-359 lished by the "Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies" (CERES princi-360 ples). Since these and most other standards of this kind target globally operating 361 businesses, they are international in scope (Abbott and Snidal 2008, 7ff).

362 How does civil regulation work through informal pressuring? For decades, CSOs aimed to 363 steer businesses by demanding legislation from governments. Since this "civil lobbying 364 strategy" oftentimes failed, civil society actors now aim to regulate businesses by addressing 365 them directly in confrontational ways (Gunningham 2005; Vogel 2010; Scherer and Palazzo 366 2011; Yaziji and Doh 2009; Lambell et al. 2008). As the references below illustrate, it was not 367 primarily the political science literature on governance, but the business literature on CSR and 368 stakeholder management that has analysed this type of regulation most systematically since 369 the 1990s. Zadek defines civil regulation as "the ability and willingness of society to create 370 collective pressure on business beyond the rule of law by threatening the productivity" of 371 businesses (Zadek 2004a, 26). As stakeholder theory shows in detail, this usually means that 372 stakeholders, that is, those who contribute to the wealth-creating capacity of a firm and that 373 are therefore "its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers" (Post et al. 2002, 19), confront businesses with social and/or environmental claims.¹² These claims are usually not based on 374 375 legal rights but on moral claims and legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Mitchell et al. 1998),

¹²FL01 ¹² Strictly speaking, civil regulation is concerned with pressure exerted by societal stakeholders such as local communities, small-scale consumers and investors, CSOs, churches, scientists and think tanks (some of which maintain contractual relations with businesses) and excludes pressure through major business stakeholders (such as institutional investors and suppliers; see the section on business self-regulation). The employee stakeholder group is somewhere between these two categories.

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376 most effectively transmitted to companies via market forces such as critical consumers and 377 ethical investors (Maxwell et al. 2000; Post et al. 2002; Midttun 2008). As various management scholars have shown in detail, stakeholders can pressure companies directly on their 378 379 own or indirectly via coalitions with other stakeholders. In both instances, they either withhold resources (e.g. via direct blockades or indirect calls for boycotts) or attach condi-380 381 tions to business transactions (e.g. directly by negotiating terms or indirectly via campaigns for certain improvements) (Frooman 1999; Hendry 2005; Yaziji and Doh 2009). Iconic 382 383 examples of effective civil regulation via pressuring (usually resembling indirect withholding 384 initiated by CSOs and enacted in a coalition with the media and consumers) are Shell's 385 drawback from the legally authorised sinking of the oil platform Brent Spar in the North Sea (Zyglidopoulos 2002; Post et al. 2002) and the European movement against genetically 386 modified food (Kurzer and Cooper 2007). As the latter case illustrates, the civil regulation of 387 388 businesses (or respective attempts) often coincides with lobbying various levels of govern-389 ment (see also Hendry 2005).

390 Although the civil regulation of businesses obviously builds on networking among civil 391 society actors, one should not overlook that the effectiveness of their networking relies 392 ultimately on the ability to harness stakeholders representing market forces (such as 393 consumers or small-scale investors in the societal domain and suppliers, large-scale 394 investors or bulk buyers in the business domain) and/or governmental actors for their 395 purposes (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Vogel 2005; Webb 2005, e.g. 272; Christmann 396 and Taylor 2006). If they fail to do so, their only viable alternative is to seek collaboration 397 in co-regulatory arrangements.

398 Domain-spanning co-regulation: four actor constellations, four types

399 Co-regulation is an umbrella term for co-operative forms of steering in which actors from 400 different societal domains aim to achieve common objectives or supply public services 401 jointly. A key feature of co-regulation is that respective practices join not only regulators 402 from different domains but oftentimes also those who are regulated and/or the beneficiaries 403 of the regulation (Cafaggi 2011, 35). While some scholars restrict co-regulation to col-404 laborations between governments and civil society (Palzer and Scheuer 2004) or to narrowly 405 defined interactions between governments and private actors (Senden 2005), a look into the 406 governance and CSR literature on the one hand and at contemporary governance practices 407 on the other reveals that civil society and businesses ("private co-regulation") as well as 408 actors from all three societal domains ("tripartite co-regulation") also engage in co-regu-409 lation (for an illustration, see Fig. 2). Public co-management that involves civil society and 410 government actors is usually not concerned with regulating businesses but with the joint 411 management of common pool resources (Ostrom et al. 1999). Although respective practices 412 rely on the network governance mode and are relevant for the pursuit of sustainable 413 development, the literature concerned with new governance and CSR rarely addresses them.

414 Among the most popular co-regulatory tools in the three actor constellations that 415 involve businesses (albeit with different characteristics that cannot be explored here) are 416 certification schemes and partnerships (the latter often going far beyond standard-setting 417 practices as described by Abbott and Snidal 2008). Partnerships are self-organising alli-418 ances in which actors from two or three societal domains strive for common goals and 419 synergies by sharing their domain-specific resources (including expertise and skills) as well 420 as risks in non-hierarchical, network-like interactions (Glasbergen 2007, 1f; Van Huijstee 421 et al. 2007, 77; McQuaid 2010, 128). Prominent examples are private-private partnerships 422 for sustainable coffee (Argenti 2004; Kolk forthcoming) and for environmentally friendly








Fig. 2 Adding four domain-spanning types of co-regulation (for similar heuristics that inspired the development of this figure, see van Marrewijk 2003, 100; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Abbott and Snidal 2008, 7f; Delmas and Young 2009b). © R. Steurer

423 refrigerators ("Greenfreeze"; Stafford et al. 2000), the tripartite Regional Climate Change 424 Partnerships in the UK (Salzmann et al. 2008; Bauer et al. 2012) and the numerous public-425 private partnerships launched by the US Environmental Protection Agency under the motto 426 "reinventing regulation" (Balleisen and Eisner 2009). The latter also stands for dozens of 427 voluntary environmental programmes, many of them being certification and labelling 428 schemes developed or enacted in close collaboration with businesses (Darnall and Sides 429 2008). Well-known and extensively researched (not to say iconised) instruments of private 430 co-regulation involving civil society actors and businesses are voluntary certification 431 schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore and Vertinsky 2000; Cashore 432 2002) and the Marine Stewardship Council (Cummins 2004). Apart from partnerships and 433 certification schemes, public co-regulation between governments and businesses also relies 434 strongly on negotiated environmental agreements (for the numerous examples in the 435 Netherlands, see Bressers et al. 2009). Examples for tripartite co-regulation defined by 436 actors from all three societal domains are the Kimberley Process CS that certifies diamonds 437 that have been produced in socially responsible ways (Wright 2004; Yaziji and Doh 2009, 438 162-165), standards or guidelines such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which guides CSR reporting (Brown et al. 2009),¹³ the UN Principles for Responsible Investment 439

 ¹³ The government actor involved in the GRI since 1999 (first in the steering committee, since 2002 in the
 13FL02 GRI board of directors) is the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (see http://
 13FL03 www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/History/OurHistory.htm; http://www.globalreporting.org/
 13FL04 AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/GovernanceBodies/Board/).

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(PRI) (Sandberg et al. 2009) and the ISO 26000 guideline for social responsibility (Ward2011).

442 Although collaboration and networking play a key role in co-regulation and respective 443 practices represent the quintessence of both new governance and CSR, one should not 444 overlook that the steering mechanisms at work here are, again, strongly aligned with the 445 market mode of governance, that is, with business concerns about brand reputation, 446 competitiveness and the urge to ease or pre-empt potentially costly civil regulation and 447 hard governmental regulation. In this sense, co-regulation often represents network gov-448 ernance in the (sometimes hardly visible) shadows of both markets and hierarchies. This 449 brings us to interactions and other linkages between the seven basic types of regulation 450 described above.

451 Interactions, hybridisation and orchestration (or meta-governance)

Thus far, I have portrayed the three domain-specific and four domain-spanning types of regulation as discrete approaches of steering. The interactions between them have emerged only in outlines. This section adds that the interplay between the three societal domains and respective types of regulation materialises in at least three distinct ways: as ordinary interactions, as hybridisation and, finally, as orchestration or meta-governance (for an illustration, see Fig. 3).

Whatever happens with regard to a particular type or tool of governance most likely has effects on other types and tools of steering (see also Abbott and Snidal 2008, 29f; Arnouts and Arts 2009, 204). As long as these interactions shape the use and contents of regulation but they do not result in new regulatory types with distinct steering characteristics, I frame




Fig. 3 Interactions, hybrid regulation and meta-governance. © R. Steurer

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them as ordinary interactions between the elements of a poly-centred governance system.These are the most obvious interaction patterns:

- Soft forms of "governing at arm's length" mean that governments do not engage directly with non-state regulation but rather hinder or facilitate respective practices from a distance, for example by informing, educating, providing guidance, appealing, approving/encouraging or disapproving/discouraging them or the actors involved. The relevance of governing at arm's length is well documented for one of the "icons of new governance": the Forest Stewardship Council (Hysing 2009; Bell and Hindmoor 2012; for other examples, see Bartle and Vass 2007; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008);
- 471 "in the shadow of hierarchy" is a hard form of governing at arm's length in which governments threaten co- as well as self-regulators with hard law in case they fail to achieve certain goals (Héritier and Eckert 2008; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Scharpf 1994);
- A hard legal environment is often a prerequisite for functioning industry or firm self-regulation (Short and Toffel 2010; Mathis 2008, 452–457) and sometimes even for the success of civil regulation or private co-regulation.¹⁴ Vice versa, new, hard governmental regulation is often a response to failed business self-regulation (currently and primarily discussed for the financial sector; see e.g. Moss and Cisternino 2009);
- 480 Business self-regulation and stakeholder management (including lobbying activities) 481 usually aim to ease or pre-empt not only actual or threatened hard governmental 482 regulation (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Héritier and Eckert 2008) but also pressure 483 coming from civil society stakeholders, who themselves may have been mobilised by a 484 lack of adequate governmental regulation (Zadek 2004a, b; Gunningham 2005; 485 Christmann and Taylor 2006; Porter and Ronit 2006; Kurzer and Cooper 2007). In this 486 sense, we could often speak of "business self-regulation in the shadow of stakeholder 487 pressure".

488 Since these and other interactions between the basic types of regulation are the norm 489 rather than the exception, disentangling governance into basic types of regulation only 490 makes sense if we do not regard them, metaphorically speaking, as "autopoietic games", 491 but as the markings of a comprehensive "governance playing field" on which actors from 492 at least three teams play their highly dynamic political games of who steers whom with 493 what means and for whose benefit. While interactions originating in the governmental and 494 societal domains usually aim to counterbalance the absence or failure of regulations in 495 other domains (in particular in the business domain) (Gunningham et al. 2003, 149; Hysing 496 2009), interactions originating in the business domain usually serve a more defensive 497 purpose. If corporate stakeholder management is successful in easing or pre-empting hard 498 governmental regulation, regulatory capture (or government failure) may be the result 499 (Laffont and Tirole 1991). In how far the notion of regulatory capture can be applied to 500 corporate stakeholder management that aims to ease the pressure coming from civil society 501 actors (e.g. by involving them in partnerships) has not been explored yet.

In contrast to the widespread framing of co-regulation (or co-governance) as hybrid
regulation (see e.g. Young 2009, 28; Lemos and Agrawal 2006, 2009; Levi-Faur 2010;
Tollefson et al. 2012), I suggest that co-regulation represents basic (yet domain-spanning)
types of regulation with unique rather than hybrid characteristics (for a similar conceptualisation of "co-governance", see Kooiman 2003). A look at private co-regulation

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 ¹⁴ As Bell and Hindmoor (2012, 155) show for the United States, hard law that requires proof of legal logging can facilitate the private co-regulatory FSC scheme because it guarantees legal compliance.

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507 located in the overlap of civil society and business underpins this as follows: CSO-business 508 collaborations such as the "Greenfreeze" project between Greenpeace and the household 509 appliance manufacturer Foron (Stafford et al. 2000) are clearly an alternative to, rather than 510 a hybrid of, for example, confrontational relations between civil society and businesses. 511 Consequently, I propose to restrict hybrid regulation to those practices that truly combine 512 two (or more) of the seven basic types of regulation to something new. Prominent 513 examples for this narrower framing of hybridisation are as follows:

- "Responsive regulation" refers, inter alia,¹⁵ to hard governmental regulation that is accompanied by soft forms of communication and persuasion in order to increase acceptance and compliance among those regulated (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite et al. 2007; Braithwaite 2007).
- 518 "Regulation by information" (Majone 1997; Lyon and Maxwell 2007) or "information 519 disclosure regulation" (Doshi 2012) is an increasingly popular regulatory approach that 520 aims to steer companies and consumers towards more sustainable production and 521 consumption by mandating the disclosure of company-, production- or product-related 522 information in standardised ways. Prominent examples are the US Toxic Release 523 Inventory (Konar and Cohen 1997) or the numerous energy efficiency disclosure 524 requirements in the EU (mandatory for cars, various electrical appliances, buildings/ 525 apartments and car tyres). Although these disclosure regulations rely on binding and 526 sanctioned laws, I regard them as hybrids because they unfold their steering potential 527 only in combination with civil regulation (mainly market pressure via consumer 528 decisions) and/or (pre-emptive) business self-regulation (Gouldson 2004).¹⁶
- "Enforced self-regulation" is business self-regulation that is subject to various forms of 529 governmental oversight (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 101-123; Baldwin and Cave 530 531 1999, 39; Bartle and Vass 2007, 889). Governmental oversight usually starts with 532 requiring firms to establish a tailored self-regulatory scheme, and it can entail 533 monitoring and/or sanctioning its implementation. Thus, enforced self-regulation is a 534 formal and transparent way of "subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors" 535 (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 103). Obviously, this subcontracting hybridises hard 536 governmental regulation with business self-regulation.
- 537 In contrast to the basic types of co-regulation explored in "Unfolding the typology" and 538 the interactions addressed above, these examples deliberately combine basic types of 539 regulation to a new (supposedly better) approach of steering. As the examples illustrate, 540 governments play a key role in hybridisation, inter alia, because they have the means to do 541 so and they seem to be interested in making non-state regulation and co-regulation work. 542 While hybrid regulation is concerned with the deliberate combination of two basic
- 542 While hybrid regulation is concerned with the deliberate combination of two basic 543 types of regulation, meta-governance is concerned with "the governance of governance" 544 more generally (Meuleman 2008, 67). As such, it includes but is not limited to hybrid-545 isation. Since the present paper focuses on the fragmentation of governance across three 546 societal domains, the meta-governance that is the most relevant here is concerned with 547 overseeing, reflecting on and orchestrating different types of regulation (for this and four

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¹⁵FL01 ¹⁵ Note that I use the concept of "responsive regulation" in a narrow sense, which is in line with the enforcement pyramid rather than with the pyramid of enforcement strategies (for details, see Ayres and 15FL03 Braithwaite 1992, 35–39).

 ¹⁶ Although voluntary (often non-state) initiatives that aim to improve the transparency of CSR (such as the
 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)) can also be referred to as "governing by disclosure" (Pattberg 2012,
 616), they must not be confused with the governmental version of regulation by information as described

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548 other meanings of meta-governance, see Jessop 2009, 93). Thus, a key issue for meta-549 governance pursued by governments is to provide direction and control on the interplay of 550 various types of regulation coming from whatever societal domain on a particular issue. 551 By doing so, governments aim at "harnessing the capacities of markets, civil society and 552 other institutions to accomplish its policy goals" (Gunningham 2005, 338, see also Peters 553 2010; Meuleman 2008; Sorensen 2006) or at least "to ensure that the private regulatory 554 tail does not wag the commonweal's dog" (Balleisen and Eisner 2009, 129). Governments 555 can provide this kind of oversight by agreeing on strategic objectives, orchestrating 556 different types and tools of regulation, monitoring their performance and making 557 adjustments (e.g. by introducing new governmental regulation), if necessary (Meuleman 558 2008; Peters 2010, 44f). In national environmental governance, the practices that come 559 the closest to this version of meta-governance are comprehensive (often cross-sectoral) 560 government strategies, for example on climate change mitigation or sustainable development (Howlett and Rayner 2006).¹⁷ However, instead of orchestrating what actors from 561 different societal domains ought to contribute to solving environmental problems, inte-562 563 grated strategies are usually restricted to communication and an often-piecemeal coor-564 dination of mainly soft governmental regulation (Steurer 2008; Casado-Asensio and 565 Steurer, forthcoming).

566 Although many scholars view meta-governance as an exclusive governmental task that 567 ought to serve public policy objectives (Meuleman 2008, 68f; Peters 2010), the previous 568 section has prepared the ground for arguing that meta-governance can also take place in 569 the two private domains, although with limited scopes and geared towards domain-spe-570 cific purposes (see also Jessop 2009). While Sorensen (2006, 103) emphasised that 571 "metagovernance can potentially be exercised by any resourceful actor, public or pri-572 vate", neither governance nor management scholars have addressed the private side of 573 governance oversight in ways that rise above the basic types of regulation and their ordinary interactions as described above,¹⁸ with one noteworthy exception: according to 574 575 Derkx (2011), meta-governance in the civil society domain is mainly concerned with 576 defining and monitoring standards for other standards. A prominent organisation that aims 577 to improve and promote a variety of sustainability standards (including the FSC and the 578 MSC) is the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) 579 Alliance (for this and other examples, see Derkx 2011). Obviously, its orchestration is 580 limited to improving already existing standards in the civil society domain only. In the 581 business domain, meta-governance is hardly researched as such, although corresponding 582 practices exist. Here, the strategic management of CSR and of stakeholder relations can 583 be framed as another limited form of private meta-governance. Although these man-584 agement practices aim to reach beyond the business domain, they are usually geared 585 towards easing or pre-empting civil and governmental regulation. Thus, improving the 586 business case of CSR through strategic (stakeholder) management can, but does not have 587 to, coincide with public policy or societal objectives (Halme and Laurila 2008; Porter and 588 Kramer 2006).

¹⁷FL01 ¹⁷ Peters (2010, 44f) also recognises performance and strategic management in the public sector as key instruments of meta-governance.

 ¹⁸ Glasbergen (2011) frames successful examples of civil or tripartite co-regulation (such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)) as private meta-governance because these schemes influenced other types of regulation. For Abbott and Snidal (2010), orchestration is, inter alia, what I frame as "governing at arm's length".

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589 Discussion and conclusion

590 The present article has disentangled contemporary governance into seven basic types of 591 regulation, several interactions and hybridisations between them, and it added the concept 592 of meta-governance. Although the article emphasises that actor constellations are impor-593 tant for making sense of governance, it highlights that steering businesses today takes place 594 in a complex, poly-centred and multi-actor governance system that eroded the boundaries 595 between societal domains (e.g. by means of co-regulation). Of course, the typology 596 developed here portrays ideal types that simplify the reality of everyday governance 597 routines. Two of the many complexities more or less ignored here stand out. First, although 598 actors are a useful criterion for differentiating types of regulation, the three societal 599 domains are, of course, no homogenous entities:

- In the governmental domain, different levels of government have different (complementary or competing) competencies that often result in diverging intentions (in particular in federal states), and at each level, different ministries/departments (or even different units within the same department) often have conflicting interests;
- Although businesses all aim at making profits, the values, cultures and management practices standing behind this common purpose (in particular the management of CSR and stakeholder relations) vary widely: while some businesses accept societal responsibilities (and even advocated for stricter public policies), others remain defensive (for environmental protection, see Rowlands 2000; Gunningham et al. 2003);
- Civil society is perhaps the vaguest of the three domains, consisting of very different
 "function systems" such as religion, art, education, science and special interest CSOs
 (Esmark 2009). In particular, the latter pursue a variety of objectives, compete for
 resources and struggle with trade-offs between social and environmental concerns.
- 613 Despite these heterogeneities, the typology developed here shows adequately that all 614 actors of a particular societal domain have a limited number of steering approaches at hand 615 that are determined by their domain-specific resources.

616 Complexity increases further if we look closer at all the secondary characteristics of 617 steering that I mentioned at the beginning of "Unfolding the typology", among them the 618 bindingness of rules and the geographical scopes of steering. Regarding the latter, very 619 similar (sometimes even identical) forms of new governance can be found at and between 620 several levels of government. As the case of Shell in Nigeria illustrates, civil regulation often 621 starts as a local movement that first gains national and eventually international momentum 622 (Wheeler et al. 2002). While differences between international and national regulation still 623 exist in the governmental domain, it seems that all other types of regulation blur not only the 624 boundaries between the public and the private (see "Governance aspects and typologies in 625 different research strands") but also those of geographical scopes. Regarding the bindingness 626 of rules, each type and sub-type of regulation described above can be broken down into 627 several governance mechanisms and tools (such as voluntary agreements or partnerships), 628 and most of them (also voluntary ones) can be designed to be more or less stringent, for 629 example with regard to monitoring, reporting and sanctioning (see e.g. McDermott et al. 630 2008). Consequently, similar governance tools from the same type of regulation can be 631 markedly different in terms of design characteristics and effectiveness. Since the typology 632 presented above had to omit these and other nuances, it can certainly be criticised as too 633 global. However, in the light of "Governance aspects and typologies in different research 634 strands", I consider it as an adequate and timely synoptic view of the increasingly complex

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governance playing field that leaves these and other nuances to narrower conceptual andempirical works.

637 Given the fact that neither public nor private meta-governance has been able to 638 orchestrate the effective use of different types of regulation on a grand scale, the governance playing field sketched here is clearly the cumulative product of countless, more or 639 640 less spontaneous initiatives that have been developed by a variety of actors in concurrence 641 with forceful trends such as globalisation, neo-liberalism and the emergence of new 642 governance as a new steering paradigm. Since it is difficult to imagine that strong centres 643 or grand meta-governance schemes will ever be able to effectively orchestrate the use of 644 different types of regulation (Rosenau 2005; Jessop 2009), the fragmentation of steering 645 and the lack of orchestration can pragmatically be regarded as an opportunity that "opens 646 the door for multiple routes of intervention" through which many actors engage in poly-647 centric governance (Meadowcroft 2007, 307; see also Braithwaite 2006, 894). Although 648 nowadays corporations may be less likely to be the subject of hard state regulation than 649 they were in Keynesian times, they are at least confronted with new types of steering (in 650 particular civil and co-regulation) that played a marginal role back then (Mellahi and 651 Wood 2003, 190f; Moon 2005; Abbott and Snidal 2008, 10f). Obviously, "hard govern-652 mental deregulation" is accompanied by soft or hybridised governmental regulation on the 653 one hand and societal "re-regulation" on the other. Interestingly, civil regulation, business 654 self-regulation and private co-regulation are not simply alternatives or complements to but 655 often-essential prerequisites for public policies: neither soft governmental regulation nor 656 increasingly popular hybrids (such as regulation by information) could function without 657 societal and/or business actors assuming significant regulatory roles (Gouldson 2004). 658 Ultimately, this "regulatory reconfiguration" (Gunningham 2005, 335) implies a new 659 division of powers between societal domains that goes well beyond the state-centric ideas 660 of Montesquieu it complements (Braithwaite 2006, 894). In how far the new checks and 661 balances between governments, civil society and businesses are sufficiently strong to 662 minimise regulatory capture and governance failure remains to be seen. The financial crisis 663 around 2010 and inadequate progress in climate change mitigation suggest that some large-664 scale governance reconfiguration trials resulted already in errors that call for changes. One 665 of many prerequisites for this purpose is to understand and relate basic types of regulation, 666 respective interactions and hybridisations properly in a synoptic view.

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